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THE GENERATION GAME: CAN WE AFFORD PLANNED PUBLIC SPENDING?
Can we afford our planned public spending on pensions, health and
education over the long run? One way of trying to find out is a
new economic technique called 'Generational Accounting'. Pioneered
by American economists Alan Auerbach and Laurence Kotlikoff and
now applied to the UK economy by researchers at the National Institute
of Economic and Social Research (NIESR), generational accounting
measures the burden that current fiscal policies are likely to impose
on future generations. It also identifies the set of policy reforms
needed to achieve 'generational balance' - a situation in which
future generations face the same lifetime net tax rates as current
generations.
The first ever set of generational accounts for the UK is published
in the latest issue of the Economic Journal in a study by Roberto
Cardarelli, James Sefton and Laurence Kotlikoff. The results suggest
that there is a relatively modest imbalance between the generations
with current generations being subsidised by future generations.
An increase in tax revenue (or a cut in spending) of £5 billion
would close the generational imbalance.
The central premise of generational accounting is that the current
budget deficit is not a good indicator of the real fiscal position.
For example, if pensions are generous and the number of retired
people will surge, then the position is unsustainable and future
taxes will have to be higher. Generational accounting estimates
the sustainability of a country's public finances by calculating
the present value of all future expenditure and comparing it to
the present value of all future tax returns. If expected spending
exceeds expected revenues, then future generations will face higher
taxes or lower spending.
With the assistance of HM Treasury and other government departments,
the NIESR team has developed generational accounts for the UK. The
main conclusion if this analysis is that without restraint in future
government purchases or increases in the net tax payments of current
British adults, future British children could well face higher lifetime
net tax rates than their parents now face. The main problem is the
UK's ageing population, which will push up the bill for pensions
and health care in the future. But the promotion of private funded
pensions means that the UK's problems are small in comparison with
other industrialised countries such as the United States, Germany,
France and Japan.
Of course, any assessment of the future has to make assumptions
about the course of future government policy. The authors calculate
generational accounts based on two possible future scenarios, both
of which assume that productivity growth averages 1.75% per annum
and interest rates are 5%:
Baseline Policy: this represents the authors' sense of current
government policy and is marked by fiscal restraint and prudence.
It assumes that social benefits, including pensions, are linked
to price inflation and that there will be a slowdown in the growth
of health care spending per beneficiary. The projections of government
spending are based on the Government Actuary Department's projections.
Looser Policy: Under this scenario, the government is slightly less
frugal. Here, pensions and other social benefits are linked to wage
inflation and health care spending is increased in line with the
Prime Minister's January 2000 announcement of his ambition to match
the European average by 2005.
Under the baseline policy, generational balance can be achieved
with a rise in income tax revenues of 5.7% - equivalent to an extra
£5 billion in revenue or about a 2p increase in the basic
rate of income tax. A cut in government spending of £5 billion
would also balance the tax burden between generations. Alternatively,
the imbalance would be completely eliminated if productivity growth
averaged 2% per annum instead of 1.75%. If the government were to
implement these changes immediately, the national debt to GDP ratio
would fall from its current level of about 40% of GDP to below 10%
of GDP by 2020 before rising again to about 40% of GDP by 2050.
Hence, the optimal policy is to pay off current debt before the
dependency ratio - the percentage of working people to retired people
- starts to rise in 2020, so that during the subsequent ageing of
the population, the government can meet some of the increase in
spending from borrowing. However, current government policy, as
outlined by its Code for Fiscal Stability, is to maintain a constant
national debt to GDP ratio.
Under the looser policy, because current generations pay less in
net taxes (due to increased benefits), there is a larger fiscal
bill left for future generations to pay. In this case, achieving
generational balance would require much stronger reforms: either
a substantial sustained cut in non-education and non-health government
spending or an equally substantial increase in income tax revenues
and a corresponding increase in social security contributions. The
authors estimate that under this scenario, the tax increase should
constitute a rise in income tax revenues of 31.3% and a rise in
social security contributions of 46.1%.
For more information go to: www.generationalaccounting.com
Note for Editors: 'Generational Accounting in the UK' by Roberto
Cardarelli, James Sefton and Laurence Kotlikoff is published in
the November 2000 issue of the Economic Journal. Cardarelli and
Sefton are at the National Institute of Economic and Social Research
(NIESR); Kotlikoff is at Boston University. The conclusions are
those of the researchers and not those of any government departments.
For Further Information: contact James Sefton on 020-7654-1931
(email: jsefton@niesr.ac.uk); RES Media Consultant Romesh Vaitilingam
on 0117-983-9770 or 07768-661095 (email: romesh@compuserve.com);
or RES Media Assistant Niall Flynn on 020-7878-2919 (email: nflynn@cepr.org).
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