Media Briefings

Union Recognition Procedures: Mandatory Votes Or Card Check?

  • Published Date: April 2002


Does the type of union recognition procedure affect a union’s ability to organise a
workplace successfully? New empirical research by Professor Susan Johnson,
published in the latest issue of the Economic Journal, reveals that of the two main
procedures used to grant bargaining rights to unions, ‘card check’ has a considerably
higher success rate in getting a union recognised in the workplace than its alternative,
‘mandatory representation votes’.
Mandatory votes require a union receive majority support of workers in the potential
bargaining unit in a secret ballot. Card check allows recognition based on membership
evidence collected by the union and does not necessarily require a vote. Johnson’s
results, based on analysis of the variation in recognition procedures from 1976-96
across provinces in Canada, shows that certification success rates are nine percentage
points lower under mandatory votes than under card check.
Reform of union recognition procedures is an important policy issue in the UK, Canada
and the United States:
?? In the UK in June 2000, formal statutory recognition procedures (based on card
check) were introduced for the first time. Policy debate concerning the introduction
of this legislation focused on whether to use card check or mandatory votes.
?? In the last 25 years, a major change has occurred in the way unions are recognised
in Canada. In 1976, every jurisdiction in Canada used card check. Today, more than
50% of the Canadian labour force is covered by mandatory vote legislation and
union recognition procedures continue to be a matter of policy concern and debate.
?? In the United States in 1994, where union recognition procedures are based almost
exclusively on mandatory votes, the ‘Commission on the Future of Worker-
Management Relations’ recommended changes to the existing mandatory vote
procedure and encouraged firms to recognise unions voluntarily based on card
check.
Evidence that the type of union recognition procedure affects the ability of unions to
organise is of interest to both unions and business. Both groups have been actively
involved in attempts to influence policy in this area - unions lobbying for card check and
business supporting mandatory votes.
Johnson’s results also help explain recent behaviour of unions in North America. In the
latest round of negotiations between the Canadian Auto Workers union (CAW) and
DaimlerChrysler, Buzz Hargrove, President of the CAW, threatened to strike if
DaimlerChrysler did not force its supplier Magna Corp. to recognise the union
voluntarily based on card check. This was an attempt by the CAW to circumvent
existing mandatory vote procedures in Ontario. Despite considerable pressure from
DaimlerChrysler, Magna Corp. refused and insisted on a representation vote.
The United Auto Workers union in the United States has used similar tactics. A recent
article in the Wall Street Journal (31 January 2002) confirms that unions in the United
States are developing successful, new strategies for organising workers that avoid
mandatory votes.
Further research by Professor Johnson (in a different, as yet unpublished paper)
provides the first empirical estimates of the impact of differences in union recognition
procedures on the differences in union density (the percentage of the non-agricultural
paid labour force that are union members) between the United States and Canada. It
has been suggested that differences in union recognition procedures provide part of the
explanation for the fact that union density in the former is less than half of that in the
latter. Simulating union density in Canada from 1976-95 with and without mandatory
votes, Johnson finds that by 1995, differences in union recognition procedures between
the United States and Canada explain at least 20% of the union density gap.
ENDS
Notes for Editors: ‘Mandatory Votes or Card Check? How the Type of Union
Recognition Procedure Affects Union Certification Success’ by Susan Johnson is
published in the April 2002 issue of the Economic Journal.
Johnson is Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Wilfrid Laurier University,
Waterloo, Ontario, Canada. Her research was supported financially by the Social
Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the Canadian International
Labour Network.
For Further Information: contact Susan Johnson on +1-519-884-1970 ext. 2672 (fax:
+1-519-884-0201; email: sjohnson@wlu.ca); or RES Media Consultant Romesh
Vaitilingam on 0117-983-9770 or 07768-661095 (email: romesh@compuserve.com).