What makes some coalitions form successfully while others – like the Kyoto Protocol – run
into difficulty?
A new survey by Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay and Kalyan Chatterjee – published in the
February 2006 issue of the Economic Journal – reveals some of the insights that game
theory brings to understanding the ways in which individuals and organisations can
successfully develop and sustain co-operation and why these might not always work.
Coalition formation is pervasive in real world scenarios, including the formation of bidding
rings, cartels and political alignment between parties. These researchers analyse the forces
behind coalition formation, which captures some of the dynamics of coalition formation.
In particular, they use this analysis to see how well they can explain the diverse political
coalitions seen in European parliamentary democracies, for example, that form between
parties both before and after elections. They review recent studies that explain delay in
negotiations in the formation of coalitions, a feature seen in the time taken to form
governments in different countries.
Finally, they sketch a model that provides an explanation for why some types of
governments (especially minority governments) are less stable than others as well as why
coalitions often form with more members than is strictly necessary.
ENDS
Notes for editors: ‘Coalition Theory and its Applications’ by Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay
and Kalyan Chatterjee is published in the February 2006 issue of the Economic Journal.
Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay is at the University of Birmingham. Kalyan Chatterjee is at
Pennsylvania State University.
For further information: contact Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay on 0121-414-6658 (email:
s.bandyopadhyay@bham.ac.uk); or RES Media Consultant Romesh Vaitilingam on 0117-
983-9770 or 07768-661095 (email: romesh@compuserve.com).