

# Technical Appendix to

## HARNESSING WINDFALL REVENUES: OPTIMAL POLICIES

### FOR RESOURCE-RICH DEVELOPING ECONOMIES

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#### Appendix B. Saddlepath Dynamics (Section 3)

We establish three Propositions, which are used in the discussion of Section 3.1.

**PROPOSITION 1.** *With a temporary ‘small’ windfall of size  $N > 0$  from time  $T_0 \geq 0$  to  $T_1 > T_0$ ,*

$$\Delta C(0) + \Delta G(0) = \exp(-\lambda_u T_0)[1 - \exp(-\lambda_u T)]N > 0, \quad (\text{B.1})$$

where

$$\lambda_u = \frac{1}{2}r^* + \frac{1}{2}\sqrt{r^{*2} + 8\sigma\Pi'Y} > r^* > 0,$$

$T \equiv T_1 - T_0 > 0$ , and  $\Delta$  indicates deviations from the benchmark trajectories.

*Proof.* Linearising (4) and (5) around a steady state with zero  $N$ , that is  $F_\infty = \bar{F} = 0$ ,  $\Pi_\infty = 0$  and  $C_\infty = Y/(1 + \psi^\sigma)$ , yields:<sup>1</sup>

$$\dot{\mathbf{x}} = \mathbf{A}\mathbf{x} - \begin{pmatrix} \Delta N \\ 0 \end{pmatrix} \quad \text{with } \mathbf{x} \equiv \begin{pmatrix} \Delta F \\ \Delta C \end{pmatrix}, \mathbf{A} \equiv \begin{pmatrix} r^* & 1 + \psi^\sigma \\ \Sigma & 0 \end{pmatrix} \quad \text{and} \quad \Sigma \equiv 2\sigma\Pi' C_\infty > 0.$$

The eigenvalues of the matrix  $\mathbf{A}$  are:

$$\lambda_s = \frac{1}{2}r^* - \frac{1}{2}\sqrt{r^{*2} + 4\Sigma(1 + \psi^\sigma)} < 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \lambda_u = \frac{1}{2}r^* + \frac{1}{2}\sqrt{r^{*2} + 4\Sigma(1 + \psi^\sigma)} > r^* > 0.$$

As one of the eigenvalues is positive and the other one is negative, the system displays saddlepath dynamics. We solve this system with spectral decomposition of the matrix  $\mathbf{A}$  (cf., Buiter, 1984):

$$\mathbf{A} \equiv \begin{pmatrix} r^* & 1 + \psi^\sigma \\ \Sigma & 0 \end{pmatrix} = \mathbf{N}^{-1} \begin{pmatrix} \lambda_s & 0 \\ 0 & \lambda_u \end{pmatrix} \mathbf{N} \quad \text{with } \mathbf{N} \equiv \begin{pmatrix} N_{ss} & N_{su} \\ N_{us} & N_{uu} \end{pmatrix},$$

where the columns of the matrix  $\mathbf{N}$  stack the eigenvectors of the matrix  $\mathbf{A}$ . The eigenvectors are calculated from the equations:

$$\mathbf{N}\mathbf{A} = \begin{bmatrix} r^*N_{ss} + \Sigma N_{su} & (1 + \psi^\sigma)N_{ss} \\ r^*N_{us} + \Sigma N_{uu} & (1 + \psi^\sigma)N_{us} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} \lambda_s N_{ss} & \lambda_s N_{su} \\ \lambda_u N_{us} & \lambda_u N_{uu} \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} \lambda_s & 0 \\ 0 & \lambda_u \end{pmatrix} \mathbf{N}.$$

<sup>1</sup> We assume  $\Pi' > 0$  at the steady state. That is not strictly necessary as long as  $\Pi' > 0$  at all points on the adjustment path towards the steady state.

Normalising such that  $N_{uu} = 1$ , we obtain  $N_{us} = \lambda_u / (1 + \psi^\sigma) = \Sigma / (\lambda_u - r^*) > 0$  from equating the two elements in the bottom row of the above matrix equation. Note that the top row gives  $N_{ss} = -\Sigma / (1 + \psi^\sigma) < 0$ . Defining the vector  $\mathbf{z} \equiv \mathbf{N}\mathbf{x}$ , we obtain  $z_u(t) = \int_0^\infty \exp(-\lambda_u t) N_{us} \Delta N(t) dt$  provided we assume that  $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \exp(-\lambda_u t) z_u(t) = 0$  holds. Restricting the solution to the stable manifold, we obtain  $\Delta C(t) = -N_{uu}^{-1} N_{us} \Delta F(t) + N_{uu}^{-1} z_u(t)$  or

$$\Delta C(t) = -N_{us} \Delta F(t) + z_u(t) = \left( \frac{\lambda_u}{1 + \psi^\sigma} \right) \left\{ \int_t^\infty \exp[-\lambda_u(t' - t)] \Delta N(t') dt' - \delta F(t) \right\}.$$

With the step function  $\Delta N(t) = N$ ,  $T_0 < t \leq T_1$  and zero at all other instants of time, this equation becomes:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta C(t) &= \left( \frac{\lambda_u}{1 + \psi^\sigma} \right) \left\{ \exp[-\lambda_u(T_0 - t)] \left[ \frac{1 - \exp(-\lambda_u T)}{\lambda_u} \right] N - \Delta F(t) \right\}, \quad 0 < t \leq T_0 \\ \Delta C(t) &= \left( \frac{\lambda_u}{1 + \psi^\sigma} \right) \left( \left\{ \frac{1 - \exp[-\lambda_u(T_1 - t)]}{\lambda_u} \right\} N - \Delta F(t) \right), \quad T_0 < t < T_1, \\ \Delta C(t) &= - \left( \frac{\lambda_u}{1 + \psi^\sigma} \right) \Delta F(t), \quad t \geq T_1. \end{aligned} \quad (\text{B.2})$$

As  $\Delta F(0) = 0$ , it follows that

$$\Delta C(0) = \exp(-\lambda_u T_0) \left[ \frac{1 - \exp(-\lambda_u T)}{1 + \psi^\sigma} \right] N > 0.$$

The initial jump in total consumption thus equals (B.1).

**PROPOSITION 2.** *With a temporary ‘small’ windfall of size  $N$  starting at time 0 and finishing at  $t = T_1$ , we have  $\Delta F(t) < 0$  for all  $t > 0$ ,  $\Delta \dot{F}(t) < 0$  for  $0 < t < T_1$  and  $\Delta \dot{F}(t) > 0$  for  $t > T_1$ . We also have (7) and (8). Comparing the outcome in the capital scarce economy with that under the PIH, we have (10).*

*Proof.* Setting  $T_0 = 0$  and substituting the last two expressions for  $\Delta C(t)$  given in (B.2) into  $\Delta \dot{F}(t) = r^* \Delta F(t) + (1 + \psi^\sigma) \Delta C(t) - \Delta N(t)$ , and making use of  $r^* - \lambda_u = \lambda_s$  yields:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta \dot{F}(t) &= -\exp[-\lambda_u(T_1 - t)] N + \lambda_s \Delta F(t), \quad 0 < t < T_1, \\ \Delta \dot{F}(t) &= \lambda_s \Delta F(t), \quad t \geq T_1. \end{aligned}$$

Solving these differential equations with the initial condition  $\Delta F(0) = 0$ , we obtain:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta F(t) &= - \left[ \frac{\exp(\lambda_u t) - \exp(\lambda_s t)}{\lambda_u - \lambda_s} \right] \exp(-\lambda_u T_1) N < 0, \quad 0 < t \leq T_1, \\ \Delta F(t) &= \exp[\lambda_s(t - T_1)] \Delta F(T_1) \rightarrow 0 \quad \text{as } t \rightarrow \infty, \quad t > T_1, \end{aligned} \quad (\text{B.3})$$

where  $\Delta F(T_1)$  is as given in (7). It follows that  $\Delta F(t) < 0$  for all  $t > 0$ . Differentiation of (B.3) yields:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta \dot{F}(t) &= - \left[ \frac{\lambda_u \exp(\lambda_u t) - \lambda_s \exp(\lambda_s t)}{\lambda_u - \lambda_s} \right] \exp(-\lambda_u T_1) N < 0, \quad 0 < t \leq T_1, \\ \Delta \dot{F}(t) &= \lambda_s \exp[\lambda_s(t - T_1)] \Delta F(T_1) > 0, \quad t > T_1, \end{aligned} \quad (\text{B.4})$$

hence,  $\Delta \dot{F}(t) < 0$ ,  $0 < t < T_1$  and  $\Delta \dot{F}(t) > 0$ ,  $t > T_1$ . Using (B.2),  $\Delta C(T_1) + \Delta G(T_1) = -\lambda_u \Delta F(T_1)$  and thus using (7):

$$\Delta C(T_1) + \Delta G(T_1) = \left( \frac{\lambda_u}{\lambda_u - \lambda_s} \right) \{1 - \exp[(\lambda_s - \lambda_u) T_1]\} N > 0. \quad (\text{B.5})$$

Hence, (8) follows. To establish the inequality sign in (10), we note that equation (B.5) becomes equal to the outcome under the PIH,  $[1 - \exp(-r^* T_1)]N$ , if  $\Sigma^* \equiv 4\Sigma(1 + \psi^\sigma) = 0$ . If we differentiate and use  $\lambda_u + \lambda_s = r^*$ , we find that:

$$\frac{\partial[\Delta C(T_1) + \Delta G(T_1)]}{\partial \Sigma^*} = \left[ \frac{\exp[(\lambda_s - \lambda_u) T_1] N}{4(\lambda_u - \lambda_s)^3} \right] \langle -r^* \{1 - \exp[(\lambda_s - \lambda_u) T_1]\} + 2T_1 \lambda_u (\lambda_u - \lambda_s) \rangle.$$

To sign the expression in the angular brackets, we note that it equals zero and its derivative with respect to  $T_1$  is positive,  $(2\lambda_u - r^*)(\lambda_u - \lambda_s) > 0$ , if  $T_1 = 0$ . For positive  $T_1$ , this derivative is even more positive. Hence, the term in curly brackets is positive for all  $T_1 > 0$  and therefore consumption at  $t = T_1$  is more than under the PIH as indicated in expression (10).

**PROPOSITION 3.** *With an anticipated ‘small’ windfall of size  $N > 0$  starting at  $t = T_0$  and finishing at  $t = T_1$ , we have*

$$\Delta \dot{F}(t) > 0 \quad \text{for } 0 < t < T_0, \quad \Delta \dot{F}(t) < 0 \quad \text{for } T_0 < t < T_1 \quad \text{and} \quad \Delta \dot{F}(t) < 0 \quad \text{for } t > T_1.$$

*A bigger  $T_0$  implies a bigger reduction in foreign debt at the end of the windfall.*

*Proof.* Upon substitution of (B.2) into the differential equation for  $\Delta F(t)$ , we obtain:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta \dot{F}(t) &= \exp[-\lambda_u(T_0 - t)][1 - \exp(-\lambda_u T)]N + \lambda_s \Delta F(t), \quad 0 < t \leq T_0, \\ \Delta \dot{F}(t) &= \{1 - \exp[-\lambda_u(T_1 - t)]\}N + \lambda_s \Delta F(t), \quad T_0 < t < T_1, \\ \Delta \dot{F}(t) &= \lambda_s \Delta F(t), \quad t \geq T_1. \end{aligned}$$

Forward integration of this differential equation yields:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta F(t) &= \exp(\lambda_s t)[1 - \exp(-r^* t)] \exp(-\lambda_u T)[1 - \exp(-\lambda_u T)]N/r^* > 0, \quad 0 < t \leq T_0, \\ \Delta F(t) &= \left[ \frac{\exp(\lambda_s t) - 1}{\lambda_s} \right] \exp(-\lambda_u T_0)[1 - \exp(-\lambda_u T)]N + \left\{ \frac{1 - \exp[\lambda_s(t - T_0)]}{\lambda_s} \right\} N, \quad T_0 < t \leq T_1, \\ \Delta F(t) &= \exp[\lambda_s(t - T_1)]\Delta F(T_1) \rightarrow 0 \quad \text{as } t \rightarrow \infty, \quad t > T_1. \end{aligned}$$

Ahead of the windfall ( $t \leq T_0$ ), the country borrows to make possible an increase in consumption [ $\Delta F(t) > 0$ ]. During the windfall ( $T_0 < t \leq T_1$ ), the country starts to pay back its debt and eventually build up assets. At the end of an anticipated windfall, we have:

$$-\Delta F(T_1) = -\left(\frac{N}{\lambda_s}\right) \{1 - \exp(\lambda_s T_1) - [1 - \exp(\lambda_s T_1)] \exp(-\lambda_u T_0)[1 - \exp(-\lambda_u T)]\} > 0.$$

Note that

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial -\Delta F(T_1)}{\partial T_0} &= -\left(\frac{N}{\lambda_s}\right) \{-\lambda_s \exp(\lambda_s T_1) + \{\lambda_u \exp(-\lambda_u T_0) - (\lambda_u - \lambda_s) \exp[-(\lambda_u - \lambda_s) T_0 + \lambda_s T]\} \\ &\quad \times [1 - \exp(-\lambda_u T)]\} \end{aligned}$$

and thus

$$\frac{\partial -\Delta F(T_1)}{\partial T_0} = -\left(\frac{N}{\lambda_s}\right) \{-\lambda_s \exp(\lambda_s T) + [\lambda_u - (\lambda_u - \lambda_s) \exp(\lambda_s T)][1 - \exp(-\lambda_u T)]\} > 0$$

at  $T_0 = 0$ . Hence, the bigger  $T_0$ , the more debt is reduced at the end of the windfall. After the windfall ( $t > T_1$ ), the second term in the expression for  $\Delta F(t)$  gradually vanishes as  $t \rightarrow \infty$ .

## Appendix C. Comparative Statics of Production

*Section 4:* The production function is  $Y = f(K, S)$  (with labour force normalised at unity and constant return to private capital and labour). Profit maximisation implies  $(1 - \tau) f_K(K, S) = r^* + \delta_K$  this implicitly defining  $K(S, \tau)$ . Totally differentiating,  $f_{KK} dK = (f_K d\tau)/(1 - \tau) - f_{KS} dS$ . The wage is  $W(S, \tau) = (1 - \tau)\{f[K(S, \tau), S] - K(S, \tau)f_K[K(S, \tau), S]\}$  so that

$$dW = W_\tau d\tau + W_S dS = -f[K(S, \tau), S]d\tau + (1 - \tau)f_S[K(S, \tau), S]dS$$

(so  $W_\tau = -Y$ )

Income is  $Y(S, \tau) = f[K(S, \tau), S]$ . Totally differentiating gives

$$dY = Y_\tau d\tau + Y_S dS = \frac{(f_K)^2}{f_{KK}} \left( \frac{d\tau}{1 - \tau} \right) + \left( f_S - \frac{f_K f_{SK}}{f_{KK}} \right) dS.$$

For the Cobb–Douglas case  $Y = L^{1-\alpha} K^\alpha S^\beta$  (with  $L = 1$ ), we have

$$Y_\tau = \frac{(f_K)^2}{f_{KK}} \left( \frac{1}{1 - \tau} \right) = \left( \frac{\alpha}{\alpha - 1} \right) \left( \frac{1}{1 - \tau} \right), \quad Y_S = \left( f_S - \frac{f_K f_{SK}}{f_{KK}} \right) = \left( \frac{\beta}{1 - \alpha} \right) \left( \frac{Y}{S} \right)$$

and  $W_S = (1 - \alpha)(1 - \tau)Y_S$ .

*Section 5:* Profit maximisation implies  $f_K(K) - \delta_K = r = r^* + \Pi(K - E)$ , this implicitly defining  $K(E)$ . Hence,  $r(E) = f_K[K(E)] - \delta_K$  and  $W(E) = f[K(E)] - K(E)f_K[K(E)]$ . Comparative statics are;

$$K_E = \Pi' / (\Pi' - f_{KK}), r_E = \Pi' f_{KK} / (\Pi' - f_{KK}), W_E = -\Pi' K f_{KK} / (\Pi' - f_{KK}), \text{ so } W_E + K r_E = 0.$$