

Technical Appendix to

SOLOW AND HETEROGENEOUS LABOUR: A NEOCLASSICAL EXPLANATION OF WAGE INEQUALITY

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Appendix

This Appendix contains the proof of Lemma 3. The proof makes use of the following lemma:

LEMMA A1 *The outcome of the competitive economy is equivalent to the outcome in a command economy where a social planner chooses an allocation that maximises aggregate output.*

We proof this equivalence first.

Proof. A social planner that tries to maximise aggregate output has to decide how to allocate given K between production and human capital acquisition (i.e. he has to choose how much capital K_P to apply as a direct input to production and how much capital K_I to use for education). His problem is

$$\max_{K_I, K_P} \left\{ F(K_P, H) : K \geq K_P + K_I, K_I = (\bar{a} - a_1)/(\bar{a} - \underline{a})I, \right. \\ H = \int_{\underline{a}}^{a_1} \frac{a}{\bar{a} - \underline{a}} da + \int_{a_1}^{\bar{a}} \frac{a^2}{\bar{a} - \underline{a}} da, \\ \left. K_P \geq 0, 0 \leq K_I \leq I \right\}$$

where a_1 denotes the threshold ability implied by maximising behaviour. That optimisation problem can be recast as

$$\max_{a_1} \left\{ F \left(K - \frac{\bar{a} - a_1}{\bar{a} - \underline{a}} I, \frac{1}{2} \frac{a_1^2 - \underline{a}^2}{\bar{a} - \underline{a}} + \frac{1}{3} \frac{\bar{a}^3 - a_1^3}{\bar{a} - \underline{a}} \right) : \underline{a} \leq a_1 \leq \bar{a} \right\}.$$

Some simple calculations show that for $K \leq \bar{K}$ no physical capital is used for additional qualification of the workers, since in this case $F_K(K, \underline{H}) \geq F_H(K, \underline{H})(\bar{a}^2 - \bar{a})/I$ according to the definition of \bar{K} . This result is analogous to the corresponding competitive equilibria in which there are no skilled workers. For $K \geq \bar{K}$ all human capital investment opportunities are exploited and the dictator uses additional capital as a direct production input. For $K \in (\underline{K}, \bar{K})$, the above maximisation problem has an interior solution with a_1 implicitly given by

$$F_K \left(K - \frac{\bar{a} - a_1}{\bar{a} - \underline{a}} I, \frac{1}{2} \frac{a_1^2 - \underline{a}^2}{\bar{a} - \underline{a}} + \frac{1}{3} \frac{\bar{a}^3 - a_1^3}{\bar{a} - \underline{a}} \right) \\ - F_H \left(K - \frac{\bar{a} - a_1}{\bar{a} - \underline{a}} I, \frac{1}{2} \frac{a_1^2 - \underline{a}^2}{\bar{a} - \underline{a}} + \frac{1}{3} \frac{\bar{a}^3 - a_1^3}{\bar{a} - \underline{a}} \right) (a_1^2 - a_1) / I = 0$$

Obviously this corresponds to a competitive equilibrium with

$$k = \frac{K - \frac{\bar{a} - a_1}{\bar{a} - \underline{a}} I}{\frac{1}{2} \frac{a_1^2 - \underline{a}^2}{\bar{a} - \underline{a}} + \frac{1}{3} \frac{\bar{a}^3 - a_1^3}{\bar{a} - \underline{a}}},$$

since $1 + r = f'(k)$ and $w = f(k) - kf'(k)$ imply a threshold ability a_1 . Owing to the uniqueness of competitive equilibria for given K , the equivalence is proven.

We are now able to prove Lemma 3.

Proof. Owing to the equivalence of the competitive and the command environment, the continuity between K and k (see Corollary 1) holds in the command economy, as well. For $K > 0$, the threshold ability above which the planner chooses to upgrade human capital is given by the $a_s(K)$ (the corresponding function a_s was introduced in (6)). An additional unit of capital yields more output according to $F_K[K - (\bar{a} - a_1)(\bar{a} - \underline{a})I, H(a_1)] > 0$ (the envelope theorem).¹ The equivalence between the environments implies that the marginal product equals $f'[g(K)]$. Concavity of the per-capita production function f and the monotonicity of g prove the claim.

¹ For $a_1 \in [\underline{a}, \bar{a}]$ this is due to the fact that the margin capital is equally useful in both applications.